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Abstract  
 
Since the rise of the activation paradigm in the 1990s, the duty to work without a wage has 
become widespread in European social assistance legislation. This paper investigates in a precise 
way the extent to which the duty to work without a wage follows the legal logic of a contractual 
relationship and how this duty is related to the fundamental right to an adequate standard of 
living. A comparison between German, Dutch and British social assistance legislation shows that 
the duty to work without a wage increasingly takes the form of a reciprocity requirement. That is, 
instead of re-integrating into regular paid work, recipients of social assistance are required to 
show that they are worthy of attaining basic social rights, not only by improving their capability 
to work but, above all, by showing a willingness to work. It concludes that the duty to work 
without a wage enhances governmental control over recipients of social assistance rather than 
improving their employability and notes that, in this respect, the Dutch social assistance regime 
seems to be stricter than the German and British ones. 
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 1. Introduction 
Since the 1990s an increasing number of European welfare states can be characterized by the 
activation paradigm. Comparative social policy studies have shown that this new paradigm of 
social policy has induced a shift from a solidaristic (and passive) welfare state towards an active 
and enabling welfare state whose main goal is the re-integration of welfare recipients into paid 
employment (Van Berkel et al, 2011; Betzelt and Bothfeld, 2011; Serrano Pascual and 
Magnusson, 2007; Stendahl et al, 2008). Some have applauded the rise of this new paradigm, as 
it aims to improve the employability of welfare claimants, while still guaranteeing a minimum 
level of protection (Hemerijck, 2013). However, others have asserted that we are seeing a 
process of convergence to a workfare approach (Handler, 2003, 2009; Jessop, 2002) which, 
amongst other things, changes the role of the state from a guarantor of social rights to the 
regulator of individual’s rights (Betzelt and Bothfeld, 2011; Serrano Pascual and Magnusson, 
2007). Legal scholars have pointed in particular at the changed contractual relationship between 
the welfare claimant and the governmental agency. Whether these contracts are called a ‘re-
integration agreement’ or a ‘claimant commitment’, they first and foremost entail that the right to 
safety net benefits is conditional on the behaviour of the recipient of social assistance 
(Eichenhofer, 2013). However, according to some legal scholars, the image of the contract does 
not match reality. Then, whereas theoretically, the contract is founded on the idea of the rational 
self-determining agent who voluntarily enters the contract on equal terms with the other party,  
the ‘re-integration agreement’ and the ‘claimant commitment are based on asymmetric power 
relations (Freedland and King, 2003).  
The central aim of this paper is to determine how the duty to work without a wage in social 
assistance legislation formally restructures (basic) social rights in the contractual relationship 
between recipients of social assistance and governmental agencies in three European welfare 
states: Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. Usually analyses of activation policies are pursued 
from a socio-economic perspective, answering questions about the (side) effects of a certain rule 
or policies. In this approach questions  belonging to a more legal perspective, like legimisation, 
legal logic and fundamental rights have been neglected. Departing from a legal perspective this 
paperinvestigates in a precise way to what extent the duty to work without a wage follows the 
legal logic of a contractual relationship and how this duty is related to the fundamental right on 
an adequate standard of living or social assistance as it has been laid down in inter alia art. 11 
ICESR, art. 13 ESC and Art. 34 (3) of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU. . As 
such, this analysis will also shed light on the aforementioned views on the activation paradigm: 
the approach that stresses the impact of social investments on the employability of recipients of 
social assistance versus the approach that stresses the emergence of the controlling state. The 
analysis will further be helpful for the formulation of some issues for a future rights based 
research agenda.   
This paper is organized in the following way. In section 2 by briefly examining different kinds of 
activation policies in Europe I justify the choice for Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. 
Sections 3 and 4 present the results of the legal comparative study. Section 5 analyses the results 
of this study. Finally, section 6 presents a social-legal research agenda on the duty to work 
without a wage for the future. 
2. Comparing social assistance activation policies in Europe 
Comparisons between national social policies of European welfare states are commonly based on 
Esping Anderson’s three worlds of welfare capitalism (1990), which describes three different 
types of welfare state. First, a liberal regime that is based on utilitarian market principles. 
Entitlements to social benefits are targeted, needs-based and means-tested and the replacement 
rates are low. Second, a social democratic or universalistic regime that is citizenship-based and 
where entitlements to social benefits are universal and replacement rates are generous. Third, the 
Bismarckian or conservative regime, which is based on an employment-related social insurance 
and usually premised on the conventional male-breadwinner family. 
Some scholars have argued that Esping Anderson’s classification is not suitable for the analysis 
of activation policies, because the regime types do not reflect the diversity of activation policies 
that have been adopted by member states (Lødemel and Trickey, 2001, Van Berkel, 2011). 
Nevertheless, as it comes to the implementation of activation policies, researchers tend to 
distinguish between two main types, which mirror Esping-Anderson’s first two types of welfare 
regimes: on the one hand a universalistic type (representing the Scandinavian countries), which 
combine high benefits, universal welfare provisions and active policy instruments, and on the 
other hand, a liberal type, representing countries such as the UK and Ireland. In these latter 
countries benefits are much lower and social assistance as a last resort is relatively important. 
The liberal type shares its emphasis on activation measures with the universalistic type. However, 
whereas the universalistic type emphasizes incentives and social investments – also called the 
‘carrot approach’ –  the liberal type instead predominantly deploys strict sanctions to ‘activate’ 
welfare dependants – ‘the stick approach’ (Larsen, 2005; Barbier and Knut, 2010).  
 
This dichotomy is not unproblematic. First, even universalistic type countries, renowned for their 
human capital investment policies, increasingly base their activation polices on the stick 
approach.2 As a matter of fact, the duty to work without a wage often possesses both stick and 
carrot elements. That is, on the one hand, this duty aims at human capital investments, preparing 
people to enter the regular labour market. On the other hand, the duty to work without a wage is 
implemented to prevent people from applying for social benefits, or to create an incentive for 
welfare beneficiaries to find a regular job as soon as possible (Van Berkel, 2006). A second 
reason why the dichotomist classification is problematic is that it fails to categorize countries 
belonging to Esping Andersons’ Bismarckian or conservative regime, such as Germany, Belgium 
and France. According to Barbier and Knut (2010), it remains to be seen if these countries will 
develop into a third ideal-type.  
 
Regarding the short comings of this Esping Anderson based classification system for a 
comparative analysis of activation measures in social assistance legislation, I propose to use the 
classification of Cantillon and Van Mechelen (2011). These authors have divided the social 
assistance legislation of 27 EU countries into four groups with respect to the degree to which 
active labour market policies are pursued (Cantillon and Van Mechelen, 2011):3  
 
(1) countries, such as Estonia and Lithuania, where national social assistance regulations are 
neither activated nor sanctioned; 
(2) countries, such as the UK and Romania, where social assistance policies combine strong 
financial incentives with strict sanctions;  
                                                          
2 With respect to Denmark see Jorgenson (2009).  
3 Only Croatia, which became part of the EU in 2013, is not included in this study. 
(3) countries, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, which  have integrated large numbers of 
recipients of social assistance into activation programmes and which tend to impose a 
relatively high number of sanctions; 
(4) countries, such as Belgium, Austria and Germany, where the numbers of recipients of 
social assistance targeted are substantially lower than in the Netherlands or Denmark, 
despite this fourth group’s use of activation measures.  
 
The countries selected for this study represent the second, third and fourth groups (i.e. the UK, 
the Netherlands and Germany).4  
 
There are also other reasons which justify the selection of these countries. For example, all 
selected countries intensified their activation policies between the late 1990s and 2005. As a 
result of these reforms these countries have either introduced or extended the possibility to work 
without a wage in social assistance legislation, such as the new deal in the UK (1998), the Hartz 
reforms in Germany (2003-2005) and the Work and Welfare Act (‘WWB’) in the Netherlands 
(2004). Yet as will be shown there is some variation with respect to the implementation of the 
duty to work without a wage. 
 
3. A legal comparison of the duty to work without a wage, as imposed on recipients of 
social assistance in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK 
Social assistance legislation comes under different names. Following Bieback (2009), I define 
social assistance legislation as those provisions that regulate need-related (cash) benefits. In all 
investigated countries the recipient of social assistance who is obliged to work without a wage 
engages in some kind of contractual relations with a governmental agency. There is some 
variation in the way the relationship between the recipient of social assistance and the 
governmental agency is structured. The Netherlands has the highest degree of decentralization, 
which means that rules on reintegration, sanctions, etc. have been delegated to the municipal 
                                                          
4 Note that regarding the selected countries, the classification of Cantillon and van Mechelen does not necessarily 
differ much from Esping Anderson’s classification. Studies updating Esping Anderson’s classification in order to 
take account of activation polices also categorize these countries into separate welfare regimes (Powell and 
Barrientos, 2004; Sapir, 2006). These studies classify Germany as a corporatist regime, the Netherlands as a 
universalistic regime, and the UK as a liberal regime.  
level where local officials enjoy some degree of discretion on reintegration measures and 
sanctions (Eleveld and Van Vliet, 2013). In Germany and the UK, social assistance and 
activation programmes are much more centralized. German social assistance schemes are usually 
operated jointly by the Federal Employment Agency and the municipalities, and, as in the 
Netherlands, officials enjoy some degree of discretion (Becker and Von Hardenberg 2010). The 
UK allows the lowest degree of administrative discretion. Even judges have little scope to 
develop law, given the very prescriptive nature of much of the social legislation (Harris 2010). 
The Department for Work and Pensions (‘DWP’) is responsible for activating recipients of social 
assistance, with implementation by the Jobcentre Plus and via external contracted provision.  
In this section I discuss different legal aspects of the obligation to work without a wage in social 
assistance legislation in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK: first, the legal basis of the duty to 
work without a wage in national social assistance legislations, including its contract form (3.1); 
second, the personal scope of application (3.2); third, the maximum length of the duty to work 
without a wage (3.3); and fourth, the shift from re-integration to civic obligation (3.4). The next 
section (4) is entirely dedicated to a central aspect of the contractual relationship between the 
recipient of social assistance and the governmental agency, namely the sanctions for non-
compliance with the duty to work without a wage.  
3.1. The legal basis of the obligation to work without a wage  
The Netherlands currently has the most straightforward social assistance scheme, which operates 
under the Work and Welfare Act (‘WWB’). Alongside this scheme there is a special statutory 
scheme (‘WAJONG’) that provides social assistance to young people with a disability, which I 
do not address in any further detail in this paper. From 1 January 2015 these schemes will be 
integrated into a single, comprehensive scheme (the ‘Participation Act’). The obligation to work 
without pay is firstly regulated under Article 9(1b) of the WBB, which obliges beneficiaries to 
participate in an employment programme if this is offered to them as part of their reintegration 
plan. Under Article 10a of the WWB, a municipality can also oblige certain beneficiaries to 
perform work activities in ‘participation placements’. Lastly, Article 9(1c) of the WWB stipulates 
that beneficiaries can be obliged to perform non-remunerated activities that serve the community. 
Germany has two separate social assistance schemes: Social Code II (‘SGB II’) and Social Code 
XII (‘SGB XII’). These reflect the earlier distinctions between the non-deserving poor (i.e. those 
able to work) and the deserving poor (i.e. those unable to work) (Eichenhofer, 2008). In this 
paper I focus on SGB II, which applies to employable people and their partners. Article 16d(1) of 
the SGB II stipulates that claimants can be obliged to participate in Arbeitsgelegenheiten in der 
Mehraufwandsvariante’ (i.e. work opportunities). These work opportunities entail what are 
referred to as ‘one euro jobs’, which means that claimants work for between 1 and 2 euros an 
hour. 
The UK has various different social assistance schemes, including the Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(‘JSA’), the Employment and Support Allowance (‘ESA’), Income Support (‘IS’), Housing 
Benefits (‘HB’) and Universal Credit (‘UC’). In this paper I refer only to UC as this scheme is 
due to replace the other income-based benefits by 2017.5 The UC scheme is regulated in the 
Welfare Reform Act 2012 (‘WRA 2012’) and the UC regulations 2013. Welfare claimants can 
be obliged to participate in ‘work preparation programmes’ under Article 16(3d) WRA 2012, 
while also being subject to some specific regulations under the Mandatory Work Activity 
programme.  
All legislatures regulate some form of contractual structure in which social assistance recipients 
have to agree to perform labour activities. These reintegration agreements (Germany), 
reintegration plans (the Netherlands) and claimant commitments (the UK) generally record the 
requirements placed upon a claimant in return for payment of the claimant’s allowances. They 
usually also stipulate what happens if the claimant does not comply with these requirements. It 
should be noted that Germany and the UK formulate the requirement to sign an agreement more 
imperatively than the Netherlands, where the WWB states that a claimant can be required to sign 
a reintegration plan.6 In the UK the right to receive benefit is conditional upon the claimant’s 
signing of a commitment,7 while the German SGB II obliges the Job Centre to enter into a 
reintegration agreement with the claimant.8  
                                                          
5 Note that contribution-based JSA and ESA will exist alongside UC from 2017. 
6 However, claimants under 27 must sign a reintegration plan.  
7 Art. 14(1) WRA 2012. A claimant who refuses to accept the commitment will not be entitled to UC. However, 
according to the Explanatory Memorandum for the Social Security Advocacy Committee (12 June 2012), claimants 
3.2 Personal scope  
The spread of the activation paradigm across Europe has involved the targeting of new groups, 
such as disabled people and lone parents, as “the undeserving poor” (Harris and Wikeley, 2007; 
Stendahl, 2008). This tendency is also evident in the social assistance legislation and practices in 
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. For example, at the start of the financial crisis, the four 
largest cities in the Netherlands imposed the duty to work without a wage on recipients of social 
assistance who were previously classified as not being able to re-integrate in regular paid work 
within a period of five years (Divosa, 2008; Divosa, 2009). Still, there is some variation between 
the investigated countries with respect to the personal scope of the duty to work without a wage. 
In principle, all social assistance claimants in the investigated countries aged 18 or older are 
required to work.9 The German law adds an extra condition in that the person eligible for the 
worker status must be employable; in other words, the social assistance recipient must not be 
unable to work within a foreseeable period. In addition, the claimant must be able to be 
employed for at least three hours a day. The various national legislations also allow some 
exemptions from the obligation to perform labour activities without a wage. The most important 
of these exemptions applies to people whose capability to work is limited for physical, 
psychological or mental reasons.10 Under the new Participation Act, however, only welfare 
beneficiaries who are fully and permanently incapacitated will be exempted from the obligation 
to work without a wage. This is much stricter than the criteria currently applied and the criteria 
applied in Germany and the UK.11  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
will be allowed a ‘cooling off’ period to give them the opportunity to reconsider and understand the consequences of 
their decision.  
8 Art. 15 SGB II. Note that, under this Article, if there is no ‘Eingliederungsvereinbarung’ (i.e. reintegration 
agreement), the job centre should issue a ‘Verwaltungsakt’ (i.e. administrative decision). According to the Federal 
Social Court, the reintegration agreement or administrative decision should provide clear information on the work 
the claimant has to perform, the location where the work is to take place, the time and date when the activities will 
start, the duration in terms of the number and distribution of weekly hours and the amount of the compensation. 
(BSG 16 December 2008 B 4 AS 60/07 R.). 
9 Art. 9(1) WWB; Art. 7 SGB II; Art. 9 UC Regulations. Note that, under the UC Regulations, 16 and 17-year-old 
claimants can also get UC if they are not in education.  
10 For details of the German regulation, see Art. 10(1) SGB II. For details of the British regulation, see Art. 9 UC 
Regulations 2013. Under current Dutch Art. 9(2) WWB the municipality may exempt social assistance beneficiaries 
from the duty to work without a wage if there are urgent reasons. Claimants with a limited capability to work often 
invoke Art. 9(2) WWB. In 2013 30 per cent of the social assistance beneficiaries were exempted from the duty to 
work under the WWB.  
11 See art. 9 (5) Participation Act.  
Recipients of social assistance performing care duties are exempted from the worker status to 
some degree in each country’s legislation. There is some variation with respect to the exemption 
of persons caring for young children. In the UK, UC claimants who are responsible for a child 
under the age of five cannot be obliged to work without a wage.12 In Germany, parents 
responsible for a child under three are entirely exempted from the worker status.13 Under the 
Dutch WWB it is, to a certain extent, at the discretion of the municipality if lone parents are 
temporarily exempted from their participation in re-integration activities such as the duty to 
work without a wage.14 This implies that lone parents with new-borns can be obliged, in theory, 
to perform this duty. On the basis of the Participation Act lone parents with young children will – 
at the discretion of the municipality - only be exempted from the duty to perform a civic job (see 
section 3.5).15 They cannot be exempted from their participation in re-integration activities. Yet, 
compared to Germany and the UK more caregivers of young children are obliged to work 
without a wage.  
There is also a difference between on the one hand Germany and the UK and the Netherlands on 
the other hand as it comes to obligation to work without a wage of other caregivers. Then, in 
contrast to the Dutch WWB, the German and British regulations exempt recipients of social 
assistance who are responsible for caring for other dependants from the obligation to work 
without a wage.16 The British legislation also explicitly (temporarily) exempts other groups from 
this obligation, such as pregnant claimants, adopters, foster parents and students.17 Claimants 
who have a minimum-wage job for at least 16 hours a week, and whose earnings are not 
sufficient to meet their day-to-day costs of living, are also exempted from the obligation to work 
without a wage. In the Netherlands, by contrast, it is not unusual for recipients of social 
assistance to have to work without a wage in addition to holding a regular job (FNV 2012).  
 
3.3 The length 
                                                          
12 Arts. 19 and 20 WRA 2012 and Arts. 89 and 91 UC Regulations 2013.  
13 The term ‘responsible parent’ refers both to a lone parent and to the person in a couple who has been nominated 
by the couple as being responsible for the child. For the definition of ‘responsible parent’ in British law, see 
Art. 19(6) WRA. 
14 Art. 9(2) WWB. The legislator has narrowed this leeway for municipalities by words like ‘only under strict 
conditions’ and ‘insofar the limitations cannot be solved by childcare services’.  
15 See art. 9(2) and article 9(7) Participation Act. 
16 Art. 10(1) point 4 SGB II, Art. 19(2b) WRA and Art. 89(1c) UC Regulations.  
17 Art. 89 UC Regulations.  
In Germany the obligation to accept ‘one euro jobs’ may be imposed on recipients of social 
assistance for a maximum of two years within a five-year period.18 This limitation in time was 
introduced by an amendment that was implemented on 1 April 2012 in order to prevent long-
term participation in ‘one euro jobs’ and to emphasize the priority of regular jobs.19 The 
maximum of two years is substantially longer than the maximum of three months during which 
claimants could be required to participate in work programmes before the introduction of Hartz 
IV in 2005. Although the German legislation does not stipulate the number of hours that a 
claimant can be required to work in a ‘one euro job’, a maximum of 30 hours a week seems to be 
common (Hohmeyer and Jozwiak, 2008; Jäger and Thomé, 2013) and has also been allowed by 
the courts.20  
In the Netherlands it is up to the municipalities to decide what kind of employment programmes 
to offer. Initially it was only possible to oblige social assistance claimants to work under Article 
9(1b) WWB which imposed a general obligation on social assistance claimants to cooperate with 
a reintegration programme. Usually these placements did not last for longer than six months and 
sought to achieve quick reintegration into regular employment. The fear that longer work project 
placements might confer employment rights on welfare beneficiaries prompted the government 
in 2008 to introduce Article 10a WWB. This allows municipalities to oblige recipients of social 
assistance to work without a wage in ‘participation placements’ for up to four years. 
Participation placements are designed for recipients of social assistance whose chances of 
finding a regular job are relatively low and who need more time to prepare themselves for the 
labour market.21 Recipients of social assistance who fail to find a regular job after a six-month 
placement under Article 9(1b) can be required to work in a participation placement for a further 
four years.22As a result, recipients of social assistance can be obliged to work without a wage for 
four and a half year. In practice, claimants are commonly required to work without a wage for 
between 16 and 36 hours a week (FNV, 2013; Kok and Houkes, 2011). 
The best-known ‘work preparation programmes’ in the UK are the Work Programme and the 
Mandatory Work Activity scheme. The Work Programme started in April 2011 and is designed 
                                                          
18 Art. 16(d)(6) SGB II. 
19 Drucksache 17/6277, p. 116.  
20 BSG 16 December 2008 B 4 AS 60/07 R. 
21 Parliamentary Papers 30 650 No. 3.  
22 Art. 10a(3) WWB.  
to assist claimants at risk of becoming long-term unemployed. Under the programme, private 
providers help claimants to get back into work by providing job search support, skills training 
and work placements designed to benefit the community.23 Claimants aged 25 or older can be 
obliged to enter a Work Programme after being unemployed for twelve months. The Work 
Programme is for a maximum of two years.  
The other new programme, the Mandatory Work Activity scheme, was also introduced in 2011. 
This scheme provides four weeks of work (or work-related activity) for up to 30 hours a week 
and is “aimed at those who require extra support to help them re-focus their approach to job 
search and gain work-related disciplines”, such as “attending on time and every day, following 
instructions, working in teams” and so on.24  
The new scheme, the Community Work Placements Programme, is targeted at claimants who 
have been unemployed for three years. It is no coincidence that this scheme has started on 28  
April 2014, two years after the launch of the Work Programme, which has a maximum length of 
two years. The Community Work Placements Programme is designed for claimants whose key 
barriers to work are their lack of work experience, lack of motivation or both. Public, private and 
volunteer organizations will place claimants in work for 30 hours a week for up to 26 weeks 
(DWP 2013). Hence, in the UK the recipient of social assistance can be obliged to work without 
a wage for a period up to two years and 30 weeks, which is substantially longer than the six 
months of wage subsidy provided under Tony Blair’s New Deal programme of 1998.25  
In fact, all investigated countries have extended the length of the duty to work without a wage 
fairly recent. The question can be raised whether this extension has improved the chances of 
finding a stable regular job? Scant research does not provide evidence of the re-integration into 
paid employment because of a long-term obligation to work without a wage (Crisp and Fletcher, 
2008).26 The duty to work without a wage only seems to have a positive effect on the re-
                                                          
23 Jobseeker’s Allowance (Schemes for Assisting Persons to Obtain Employment) Regulations 2013/276, Art. 3(8).  
24 Explanatory Memorandum to the Jobseeker’s Allowance (Mandatory Work Activity Scheme) Regulations 2011, 
points 2 and 7.3. See also Art. 2(1) of the Jobseeker’s Allowance (Mandatory Work Activity Scheme) Regulations 
2011 (2011/688). 
25 Claimants who are seriously disadvantaged in the labour market, including those who have recently received 
incapacity benefit, may be required to enter the Work Programme after three months of unemployment (Work 
Programme Provider Guidance, Chapter 2, Annex A, updated 26 November 2012).  
26 Research in the Netherlands has shown that the regional labour market is more effective for re-integration into 
regular paid employment than municipal re-integration policies (Edzes, 2010).  
integration of men into regular employment at the very start of the programme (the ‘stick effect’), 
and between weeks 10 and 25 of unemployment (Graversen and Van Ours, 2008, Pedersen et al, 
2012). There also seems to be a group of welfare beneficiaries that constantly moves between 
poorly paid jobs and a welfare situation ( Bruttel and Sol, 2006; Eichorst and Konle-Seidl, 2008). 
In Dutch policy language persons belonging to this group are called ‘flex beneficiaries’ (Divosa 
monitor, 2008 and 2009). In Section 5 I will further reflect on this issue. 
3.4 Reciprocity 
In 2012 the Dutch government introduced the ‘civil community job’ in social assistance 
legislation.27 According to the government, the civil job entails a ‘civic obligation in return for 
the solidarity people receive from the community’.28 As the government contended, the principle 
of reciprocity is more appropriate in a more participative society in which everyone contributes 
according to his or her ability and where citizens take responsibility not only for their own lives, 
but also for the society in which they live.29 Hence, the primary goal of civil community jobs is 
not to reintegrate claimants into regular jobs, but instead to get them to do something in return 
for their allowances. According to the Participation Act all municipalities will be obliged to 
develop municipal policy on civil community jobs.30 The Participation Act imposes a few 
conditions on the obligation to perform civil community jobs: (1) the performance of civil 
community jobs should not impede the re-integration of the recipient of social assistance in 
regular jobs; (2) the length of these activities should be limited;31 (3) the municipalities are 
required to take individual circumstances into account in case they impose the obligation to 
perform civil community jobs. That is, the recipient of social assistance should be physically, 
psychologically and mentally capable of performing this job. The municipality does not, 
however, need to take account of recipients of social assistance’ previous work experience.  
Despite the fact that the German and British have not implemented the civic obligation into their 
social assistance legislation, legal and political changes indicate that also in these countries,the 
duty to perform work without a wage does not exclusively serve the goal of re-integration in a 
                                                          
27 Art. 9(1c) WWB. 
28 Parliamentary Papers, 2011-12, 32815, No. 3, 14-15. 
29 Parliamentary Papers, 2013-14, 33801, No. 3.  
30 Art. 7 (3) Participation Act. 
31 The Court of Breda has ruled that a 32-hour working week is too long for such jobs (Court of Breda, 25 February 
2013, LJN BZ 5171). 
regular job anymore. For example, whereas the aim of the German ‘one euro jobs’ is to increase 
employability and opportunities to participate in the regular labour market,32 a recent amendment 
revoked a clause that required ‘one euro jobs’ to contribute to improving claimants’ professional 
knowledge and skills.33 We also find evidence for a turn to a civic obligation in the 
parliamentary history. In 2008, for example, the German government argued, in response to 
questions from the left-wing opposition, that the goal of ‘one euro jobs’ was not only to 
reintegrate the unemployed into regular jobs, but that performing ‘one euro jobs’ also served as 
an act of reciprocity by welfare beneficiaries towards the community.34 In addition, in 2011 the 
German Parliament started a petition requiring employable welfare recipients to perform public 
labour activities in return for their allowances, while imposing sanctions on those refusing to 
participate or failing to turn up on time.35 At the same time the responsible Minister, Von der 
Leyen (CDU), stated that the unemployed should be expected to do something in return for their 
monthly allowance funded by taxpayers.36  
We find a comparable trend in the UK. The Mandatory Work Activity Provider Guidance, for 
example, states that “A community benefit placement must be of benefit to the community over 
and above the benefit of providing a placement to the individual”.37 In addition, according to the 
government’s guidance on Mandatory Work Activity, “There is no work experience element for 
the MWA scheme, instead there is a work placement for community benefit”.38 This suggests 
that that a reciprocal act by the claimant towards the community is even more important than the 
extent to which the work placement contributes to the claimant’s chances of finding a regular job 
This turn to reciprocity is confirmed in the new political discourse. For instance, in 2008 the 
Conservatives who were still in the opposite that time, argued that they would ‘not allow anyone 
claiming Jobseekers Allowances over a long period to do nothing’(Conservative Party, 2008, p. 
34). And in 2013, Chancellor, George Osborne, announcing the new Community Work 
Placements Programme, reiterated the language used by the Conservative Party five years earlier, 
                                                          
32 Drucksache 17/622, p. 115. 
33 Amendment of Art. 3(2) SGB II of 1 April 2012.  
34 DB 16/8934.  
35 Petition 16634. Gemeinnützige Arbeit für Arbeitslosengelt II-Empfänger, 17 February 2011.  
36 Frankfurter Allgemeine, 20 January 2010. 
37 These words are in bold type in the Mandatory Work Activity Provider Guidance, Chapter 1, Annex 1, A1.3. 
38 Advice for Decision Making, Chapter K3, K3037. 
arguing that “There is no option of doing nothing for our benefits, no something-for-nothing 
anymore”.39 
4. Sanctions 
In the contractual relationship between the recipient of social assistance and the governmental 
agency sanctions have a central place. If the recipient of social assistance fails to do her part of 
the agreement (i.e. to work without a wage), the governmental agency may also refrain from her 
part of the agreement (i.e. to pay benefits). In all countries studied, sanctions can be imposed on 
recipients of social assistance who do not show up for work, who arrive late or who otherwise 
misbehave at their designated place of work. Usually this means that their allowances will be cut. 
In this section I compare the amount of the sanction, the implemented hardship clauses and the 
effect of a sanction in the amount of the benefit. 
4.1 The amount of the sanction  
The German and British legislators have laid down the sanctions in formal law. Sanctions can be 
imposed on recipients of social assistance in Germany if they refuse to perform reasonable 
labour activities (i.e. ‘one euro jobs’) without a good reason.40 The sanction amounts to a three-
month reduction of their allowances by 30 per cent for a first failure to work, with any second or 
third failure being punished by cuts for three months of 60 per cent and 100 per cent 
respectively.41  
In the UK, a low-level sanction can be imposed if a claimant fails to meet a work preparation 
requirement, such as participation in the Work Programme, without good reason.42 The sanction 
of a cut of 100 per cent in the allowance can be imposed for an indefinite number of days, 
starting on the date the sanctionable action took place and ending no earlier than the date on 
which the claimant fulfils the condition. A fixed-period sanction of between 7 and 28 days may 
also be imposed. Higher fixed-period sanctions apply if a claimant fails to meet a Mandatory 
Work Activity without good reason. In that case a higher-level sanction of 100 per cent may be 
                                                          
39 Speech by Chancellor Osborne, 30 September 2013. 
40 Art. 31(1) SGB II.  
41 Art. 32a(1) and 31b(1) SGB II. The sanctions are slightly different for welfare beneficiaries under 25. 
42 Art. 27 WRA 2012. 
imposed for 91 days. In the event of a second failure to comply, a reduction may be applied for 
182 days.43  
In the Netherlands the municipality reduces the benefits in accordance with its municipal 
regulations.44 Municipal regulations usually allow allowances to be cut by 20 per cent for one 
month in the event of a minor failure, but the reduction may rise to 100 per cent. Although the 
Central Appeals Tribunal (‘CRvB’), which is the highest appeal court in the Netherlands for 
social security cases, has forbidden the imposition of indefinite sanctions, it has nevertheless 
allowed a sanction of 100 per cent for seven months.45 The proposed legislative amendments 
reduce much of the municipal discretion in this respect. From 1 January 2015, municipalities will 
be obliged to reduce allowances by 100 per cent for one month if social assistance claimants do 
not comply with reintegration duties.46 In case of recidivism the allowances may be reduced by 
100 per cent for three months.47 The municipal sanction system with respect to the civic 
obligation will not be altered.  
4.2 Hardship regulations 
In some cases, imposed sanctions can be softened by hardship regulations. In Germany, for 
example, beneficiaries whose allowances are cut by more than 30 per cent can apply for 
supplementary benefit in kind. Although it is up to the Job Centre to decide whether to grant this 
benefit, it is obliged to grant it if the household includes minor children.48  
In the UK, beneficiaries upon whom sanctions have been imposed may claim hardship payments 
(which are usually recoverable) if they cannot meet their immediate and most basic and essential 
needs or those of a child for whom they are responsible and providing the claimant (now) meets 
all work-related requirements.49 In addition, the sanction may also be reduced by 40 per cent in 
certain situations, such as if the sanctioned person is responsible for providing care.50 The DWP 
                                                          
43 Art. 26 WRA 2012. 
44 Art. 18(2) WWB.  
45 CRvB 3 July 2012, RSV 2012/210. 
46 See Art. 18(5) Participation Act.  
47 See Art. 18(6), 18(7) and 18(8) Participation Act.. 
48 Art. 31a(3) SGB II. 
49 Art. 28 WRA; Art. 116(2) and (3) UC Regulations and Art. 16(d 2 b-d) and (3) SS (LB) Regulations.  
50 A 40 per cent reduction can also be granted in the event of pregnancy (in the final eleven weeks of pregnancy) and 
childbirth (in the first fifteen weeks after childbirth) and if the claimant has adopted a child in the previous twelve 
months (Art. 111(1) UC Regulations). 
may also visit claimants considered vulnerable, such as those with a mental health condition or a 
learning disability before applying a sanction, in order to establish whether there was a good 
reason for the failure to comply.  
Under the Dutch WWB, sanctioned recipients of social assistance can claim hardship payments 
only in very exceptional circumstances.51 In practice, these kinds of claims hardly even succeed. 
For example, recently, in a case where the municipality imposed a sanction of 100 per cent 
during six months, the Central Appeals Tribunal dismissed an appeal on a general hardship 
clause, notwithstanding the presence of dependent children, major debt problems and imminent 
eviction.52 Nonetheless, the new Participation Act contains hardship clauses similar to those in 
the German and British regulations. For example, according to these amendments, a municipality 
may revise the 100 per cent cut before the sanction period has ended, if the beneficiary now 
complies with the mandatory activities.53 The municipality can also decide to reduce the sanction 
in the event of urgent reasons, such as further marginalization, debt problems and evictions.54 
And, like the German and British legislation, special attention has to be paid to family interests 
in case sanctions are imposed.55  
4.3 the effect of a sanction in the amount of the benefit 
It is important to notice that the effect of a sanction of 100 per cent is not the same for all  
investigated countries. That is, for a full understanding of the possible impact of sanctions, we 
need to take a closer look at the composition of the allowances. Social assistance allowances in 
the Netherlands comprise a single monthly sum, the amount of which depends on the 
composition of the household. The German and British allowances, on the other hand, contain 
differing elements. Whereas in the Netherlands the sanction is imposed on the total monthly sum 
received, the sanctions in Germany and the UK are imposed only on the cost of living allowance 
(Germany)56 or the standard allowances (UK).57 In the case of Germany this means that 
sanctioned recipients of social assistance retain their entitlement to inter alia allowances for 
                                                          
51 Art. 16 WWB. 
52 CRvB 17 December 2013, 12/3121 WWB, USZ 2014/28. 
53 Art. 18(7) Participation Act.  
54 Art. 18(6) Participation Act. See also the Parliamentary Papers 2013-14, 33801, No.3. 
55 Art. 18(8) Participation Act. 
56 Art. 31a(1) SGB II and Art. 20 SGB II. 
57 Art. 111(1) UC Regulations. 
women who are more than 12 weeks pregnant, extra allowances for lone parents,58allowances for 
reasonable costs of rent and heating,59 and extra allowances for children under sixteen who are 
living in the household.60 In the UK, sanctioned recipients of social assistance retain their 
entitlement to additional allowances for children and housing costs.61  
The differences between the systems can be illustrated by the example of a workable, 
unemployed lone parent with two children aged seven and nine in the household. For the 
purposes of the example, we will assume that the person pays monthly rent of €350 with heating 
costs of €100 a month. If this person receives a 100 per cent sanction because of refusing to 
attend a designated work project, the sanction hits hardest in the Netherlands, where the total 
allowance received will reduce by 69 per cent (from €1338.61 to €412.14). This is much higher 
than in Britain, where the reduction will be 25 per cent (from €1484.15 to €1112.60), and 
Germany, where the reduction will amount to only 21 per cent of the total allowance (from 
€1847.52 to 1465.52).62 The relative reduction depends, first of all, on factors as the number and 
age of children living in the household. In addition, as table 1 demonstrates, the height of the rent 
also slightly reduces the differences between the countries. 63  
Table 1 Reduction of total allowance after 100 per cent sanction 
Rent Germany the Netherlands The United Kingdom 
€200 23% 77 % 28% 
€350 21% 69 % 25% 
€500 19% 64 % 23 % 
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58 Art. 21(2) SGB II. 
59 Art. 22 SGB II. 
60 Art. 23 SGB II. 
61 Housing costs are fully subsidized, providing the rent is reasonable and the house is not too large.  
62 I have taken into account all social assistance benefits and allowances the claimant receives for the children, 
housing and heating. Amounts are based on the monthly rates in 2013 (GBP 1 = EUR 1.19, 16 November 2013). 
Sources used: www.missoc.org, www.belastingdienst.nl (consulted on 25 November 2013), Jäger and Thomé (2013) 
and Child Poverty Action Group (2013/2014).  
63 For Germany and the United Kingdom I assumed that a rent of €500,- was considered reasonable, since this is a 
condition for receiving rent subsidy. 
The analysis in Sections 3 and 4 has shown that the contractual relationship between recipient of 
social assistance and government agencies in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK has been 
restructured in important ways. First, the personal scope of the programmes has been extended as 
a result of which more and more people with a long distance to the labour market are subjected 
to the contractual duty to work without a wage. Second, there is a tendency to extend the length 
of the programmes to work without a wage, as a result of which recipients of social assistance 
can be obliged to perform work activities without receiving wage for consecutive years. At the 
same time, evidence from empirical research raises doubts whether this extension positively 
effects the chances of finding a regular paid job. In fact, the first and the second trend are in line 
with a third trend, according to which the duty increasingly takes the form of a reciprocity 
requirement. That is, instead of re-integrating in regular paid work, the recipient of social 
assistance is more and more expected to do something in return for her benefits. This probably 
explains why the extension of the personal scope and the length of the obligation to work without 
a wage has not met much resistance.  
The shift to reciprocity also reveals the increased significance of the contract: in order to receive 
benefits recipients of social assistance are required first to show that they are worthy of attaining 
basic social rights, not only by improving their capability to work but, above all, by showing a 
willingness to work. However, instead of reflecting the contractual norms of consent and 
voluntariness, this contract is characterized by the imbalance of power relations: if the recipient 
of social assistance refuses to fulfil her part of the contract she either loses her safety net benefits 
or faces a sanction that amounts to a temporary loss of these benefits. Thus this leaves the 
recipient of social assistance with no choice than to comply with the duty to work without a 
wage. Only in cases where recipients of social assistance obtain regular paid jobs will they be 
able to enter a contractual relationship with the government/state on fairly equal terms. Until 
they reach that stage they are in fact “virtual citizens” who are “in an active state of becoming 
full citizens” ( Schinkel, 2010; Schram, 2010). Indeed, recipients of social assistance, especially 
those who are required to work without a wage, are bound to be treated differently from “full 
citizens”, which means inter alia that their social rights are constantly at risk of being curtailed. 
In conclusion, the shift to reciprocity has increased the significance of the idea of the contract in 
the duty to work without a wage. Importantly, this idea of the contract does not follow the legal 
logic of a contractual relationship in which parties enter the contract voluntarily and on equal 
terms. Instead, recipients of social assistance are at risk of losing fundamental rights. Not only 
because they may lose access to the fundamental right on an adequate standard of living or social 
assistance, but also because, being treated as second class citizens, they risk losing access to 
other basic (social) rights as well. Both points will be further addressed in the agenda for future 
research (section 6).   If we return to the two views outlined in the introduction, this analysis 
seems to endorse the view that the new contractual relationship first and foremost reinforces 
control mechanisms, which  enhance the role of the state as the regulator of the behaviour of 
welfare claimants. What about the other view, which stresses the positive effects of social 
investment and the improvement of employability of recipients of social assistance? There are 
two issues I would like to discuss in this respect. First, the shift from re-integration to reciprocity 
already shows that the duty to work without a wage is not necessarily related to the enhancement 
of the human capital of recipients of social assistance. Second, the question can be raised as to 
whether people really need more than four years of ‘on the job training’ before they are able to 
perform (very) low skilled jobs. And likewise should the ‘flex beneficiary’ who moves between 
low skilled jobs and social benefits, be ‘retrained’ every time for the same low skilled jobs?  
Of course this analysis does not provide hard conclusions with respect to the extent to which the 
duty to work without a wage enhances the human capital of recipients of social assistance. To 
address this issue properly we will need more empirical evidence that provides answers to 
questions such as:  
1. What is the (structural) effect of the duty to work without a wage on the employment rate? 
Due to the fact that these studies need a control group, there are not many (European) 
studies available measuring structural effects, in particular with respect to the effects of 
long-term obligations to work without a wage.  
2. What is the education and work experience of the recipients of social assistance who are 
obliged to work without a wage, and to what extent do these characteristics match the 
content of the work programme?64  
Anyway, it is clear that in the Netherlands the restructuring of the contract between the recipient 
of social assistance and the government agency has not resulted in increased (financial) efforts of 
                                                          
64 Inquiries of the largest Dutch labour union have revealed that the imposition of the duty to work without a wage 
on social assistance beneficiary with fairly recent job experience is not unusual (FNV, 2012; FNV, 2013). 
the government to enhance the employability of the recipients of social assistance. Instead, since 
the introduction of the WWB the expenditures for active labour market policies have constantly 
dropped (Eleveld and Van Vliet, 2013).  
Finally, in case the conclusion is right that the duty to work without a wage enhances 
governmental control over recipients of social assistance instead of improving their 
employability, the Dutch social assistance regime seems to be stricter than those in the other two 
countries. This is remarkable regarding what might be expected from the classification used by 
Cantillon and Van Mechelen (2011). The Dutch legislation, then,  not only allows long-term 
work programmes to start earlier than in the UK, but also allows for longer programmes and 
longer working weeks, with fewer exemptions from the obligation to work without a wage. In 
addition, the sanctions in the Netherlands are relatively high, and the Netherlands is the only 
country that has introduced civic jobs that are not specifically intended to help claimants to enter 
the labour market.  
6. Outlook 
It was not possible to cover all legal issues with respect to the contractual duty to work without a 
wage in social assistance legislation. Therefore in this section I want to design a future agenda 
for social-legal research on the duty to work without a wage. In my opinion this agenda should at 
least address the following issues: 
1. The question to what extent the duty to work without a wage can be found in breach with 
the prohibition on compulsory labour Article 4 ECHR and ILO Convention 29.65 This 
question is interesting, in particular from the perspective of the contract. The metaphor of 
the contract, then, does not hold, if recipients of social assistance are in fact obliged to 
perform certain labour activities.  
2. The formal employment rights of the recipient of social assistance who is obliged to work 
without a wage. Employment rights are often justified because of the unequal bargaining 
position of employees (Davidov and Langille, 2011). Along these lines it could be argued 
                                                          
65 For Dutch ruling see: CRvB 8 February 2010, LJN BL 1093; RSV 2010/79. For British ruling see: [2012] EWHC 
2292 (Admin), [2013] EWCA Civ. 66, [2013] UKSC 68. For German ruling see: Arts. 12(2) and (3) of the German 
Constitution. See BSG, 16 December 2008 B 4 AS 60/07 SozR 4-4200 para. 16 No. 4, BSG 13 April 2011 B 14 AS 
101/10 R SozR 4-2000 para. 16 No. 8. Also see the article by Vonk in this issue. 
that recipients of social assistance should be entitled to even more protective rules, 
because the contractual position of recipients of social assistance is more vulnerable 
compared to the contractual position of employees. However the reverse is the case. 
Legal research can pinpoint gaps in protective rights between on the one hand employees 
and on the other hand recipients of social assistance.  
3. The employment protection of the recipient of social assistance in practice. Even though 
recipients of social assistance may formally enjoy some (employment) rights, it is not at 
all clear to what extent these rights are enforced on the work floor. Social legal 
(ethnographic) research can be helpful for mapping the extent to which formal legal 
rights are enforced in practice.  
4. The use of ‘good reason’ clauses and hardship clauses. As far as access to social rights is 
concerned, hardship clauses would seem to help ensure sufficient levels of income for 
sanctioned recipients of social assistance, particularly if children are involved. However, 
further legal research is needed to establish what counts as a ‘good’ reason and how 
hardship clauses are interpreted by the court. 
5. The effect of invoking fundamental social rights. The question I would like to answer here 
is whether fundamental social rights are able to provide a counterweight to misbalanced 
contractual relations between recipients of social assistance and governmental agencies. 
I believe these are the five core issues for future social legal research on the duty to work 
without a wage in social assistance legislation. Together with two socio-economic research 
questions mentioned in Section 5, I have provided a list of at least seven subjects for future 
research. It is important to notice though that it is impossible to protect the position of 
working recipients of social assistance by formal legal rules only. There will always remain a 
margin of discretion within which recipients of social assistance who are obliged to work 
without a wage are in fact at the mercy of both the governmental agency and/or the 
‘employer’. As mentioned before (see point 3), ethnographic research can be helpful to map 
the social social-legal position of these recipients of social assistance.  
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